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TORTS-PARENT-CHILD-ACTION BY CHILD FOR INDIRECT INTERFERENCE 
WITH FAMILY RELATIONSHIP-Five minor children sued for the loss of their 
mother's support, care and affection which resulted from the defendant's 
negligent injury of the mother in an auto accident. Defendant moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. Held, motion denied. A minor child has a cause of action 
for damages resulting from an indirect, negligent interference with his 
rights in the family relationship. Scruggs v. Meredith, (D.C. Hawaii 1955) 
134 F. Supp. 86.8. 
The history of recovery for interferences with the family relationship1 
has been one of almost continual extension. By drawing an analogy to 
the master-servant relationship, the common law early recognized the 
right of the husband to recover for interferences in the marital relationship 
which resulted in the loss of his wife's services.2 The recovery was extended 
to cover indirect interferences (e.g., the negligent injury of the wife) as 
well as direct interferences (e.g., abduction),3 and loss of the society and 
affection of the wife as well as of her services.4 Since the wife had no claim 
to her husband's services at common law, her right to recover for inter-
ferences in the marital relationship has been recognized only since the 
emancipation statutes and, in general, much more hesitantly.15 The analogy 
to the loss of the services of a servant was also employed to give the parent 
1 See Green, "Relational Interests," 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934). 
2 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 427-430 (1937). 
3 3 TORTS RESTATEMENT §§683-685, 693 (1938). 
4Ibid. 
5 See Holbrook, "The Change in Meaning of Consortium," 22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923). 
While the wife's right to recover for direct interferences is generally allowed, only a 
minority of states recognize her right to recover for indirect interferences. PROSSER, TORTS, 
2d ed., 690-692, 703-705 (1955). 
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a right to recover for direct or indirect interferences in the parent-child 
relationship.6 The requirement that the loss of services must underlie 
the recovery has similarly been largely dispensed with.7 Like the wife, 
the child had no legally protected interest in the family relationship at 
common law and it is only recently that even a minority of states have 
recognized his right to recover for direct interferences in that relationship.8 
The principal case is the first successful attempt to recover for an indirect 
interference.9 This review of the developments in the area might be viewed 
as indicating a strong "trend" of judicial precedent and sentiment toward 
giving fuller protection to the family relationship.10 But a court consider-
ing the possibility of permitting a child to recover for indirect (and 
especially unintentional) interferences with his interest in that relationship 
might deny recovery by reference to any of the following arguments.11 
First, since the child has no claim to the services of the parent, the technical 
basis for recovery at common law is absent, and no cause of action will 
Iie.12 Secondly, admitting that some cause of action may now be recognized, 
there is no precedent for the recovery in the court's jurisdiction. There-
fore, the recognition of any right to recover must be left to either the 
legislature13 or an appellate court.14 Thirdly, even though absence of 
precedent is not determinative, there is no interest in the child which 
should be legally protected. The minor child's interest in the family 
relationship is not certain enough,15 is too remote from the wrong actually· 
committed,16 and cannot and should not be compensated for by money 
damages.17 Fourthly, although some interest may exist, the practical prob-
lems of litigation argue against its recognition. Assessment of damages 
to the interest is too difficult in light of the intangibles involved and the 
possibilities of overlapping with the parent's recovery for his or her own 
injury;18 litigation will be multiplied excessively by recognizing rights in 
6 3 TORTS llEsTATEMENT §§699-701, 703 (1938). 
7 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 694-696, 699-701 (1955). But cf. 3 TORTS REsTATEMENT §703, 
comment g (1938). 
s See the leading case of Daily v. Parker, (7th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 174. See also 
Russick v. Hicks, (D.C. Mich. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 281; 39 CALIF. L. REv. 294 (1951). 
9 Three cases have denied recovery: Jeune v. Del E. ·webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 
269 P. (2d) 723 (1954); Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 
739; Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935). 
10 For an exhaustive citation and discussion of the very substantial number of cases 
opposing this "trend," see Lewis, "Three New Causes of Action? A Study of the Family 
Relationship," 20 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1955). 
11 These arguments have been drawn from cases and materials dealing with direct 
or indirect interferences with the wife's or child's interest in the family relationship. 
12 Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E. (2d) 545 (1950). 
13 Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E. (2d) 74 (1951). 
14 Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, note 9 supra. 
15 See 83 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 276 (1934). 
16 Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.; 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). 
17 Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. (2d) 432 (1949). 
18 See Pound, "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," 14 MICH. L. REv. 177 
at 194 (1916). 
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a potentially large group of persons like the children;19 the recognition of 
rights in the children may upset settlements made with the parent;20 and 
the claims themselves are too susceptible of fabrication.21 Finally, the 
court may conclude that recovery is limited by the presence of a "heart 
balm" statute in its jurisdiction.22 Many of these arguments are equally 
applicable to any extension which allows the wife to recover for indirect 
interferences in the family relationship or the child to recover for direct 
interferences, and the rebuttal which has been presented in that connection 
can only be mentioned by reference.23 However, the arguments that the 
injury to the child's interest is too remote for recognition and too difficult 
of assessment gain special weight from the fact that recovery is being ex-
tended in the principal type of case so that it covers, at the same time, a 
potentially large group of persons-the children-and indirect interferences 
with their interests. If recovery is allowed for loss of support, care and 
affection against Mr. Motorist, who has negligently injured the mother of 
five in an auto accident, he may find his liability skyrocketing out of all 
proportion to any lack of care of which he may have been guilty. Liability 
may be stretched so far that it may be necessary to find that injury to the 
children was not a hazard "apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance"M 
or that it was not a "normal, substantial part of the risk."25 Allied with the 
other considerations noted above this may be sufficient to warrant a denial 
of the children's claims. On the other hand, the children have undoubtedly 
been injured. The recognition of the parent's important role in developing 
the mental health of the child makes even the claim for loss of affection 
far from tenuous.26 If a court is to create a legal right to recovery where 
none existed before it can and should consider this injury. But before it 
glibly catches hold of the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium, it should also 
carefully consider the above-mentioned arguments which militate against 
allowing recovery. 
William R. ]entes, S. Ed. 
19 Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934). 
20 Ripley v. Ewell, (Fla. 1952) 61 S. (2d) 420. 
21 Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A. (2d) 768 (1947). 
22 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 697, 698 (1955). 
23 See Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 CoL. L. REv. 651 (1930); 20 
CORN. L. Q. 255 (1935); 39 CALIF. L. REv. 294 (1951). But cf. Lewis, "Three New Causes 
of Action? A Study of the Family Relationship," 20 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1955). 
24 That is, that no duty of due care was owed the children. Palsgraf v. Long Island 
R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 342, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
25 That is, that his act was not the proximate cause of the injury. PROSSER, TORTS, 
2d ed., 259 (1955). 
26 Gesell, "Child Psychology," 3 ENCYC. OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 391-393 (1930). 
